

Ironclad


A formally verified OS kernel written in SPARK and Ada.

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Ada Monthly Meetup - Sat, Nov 4, 2023


So what is Ironclad?

- POSIX-compatible formally-verified (to an extent) kernel.
- Hard real-time facilities and flexible scheduling.
- Highly portable.
- Free as in freedom.




What are the goals of Ironclad?


- A highly secure architecture.
- Hard real-time suitability without compromising general purpose computing.
- Doing so keeping in mind POSIX compatibility.




Operating system architecture




Operating system architecture




So, what makes Ironclad special?




Mandatory Access Control (MAC)



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


Mandatory Access Control (MAC)



Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

Hey, could I overwrite this path in the filesystem?




Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

Things ~~X~~ can do:

- Allocate memory
- Do inter process communication
- Access entropy resources
- Open files read only.

overwrite this path in the




Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

Things ~~X~~ can do:

- Allocate memory
- Do inter process communication
- Access entropy resources
- Open files read only.

DENIED

overwrite this path in the



Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

Init (PID 1)

Zero MAC context



Gives initial permissions

PID 2

MAC context



```
type Capabilities is record
```

```
  Can_Change_Scheduling : Boolean;
```

```
  Can_Spawn_Others      : Boolean;
```

```
  ...
```

```
end record;
```

```
type Context is record
```

```
  Action : Enforcement;
```

```
  Caps   : Capabilities;
```

```
  Limits : Limit_Arr;
```

```
  Filters : Filter_Arr (1 .. 30);
```


```
end record;
```

Scheduling

- Processes: Owns a memory map, threads, open files.
- Thread-cluster: Groups threads regardless of process and coordinates them.
- Threads: Basic unit of processor execution, has a set of registers and stack.



Scheduling



Formal verification

- 3 tiers.
- Architectural code that is **difficult to verify** or **can be reasonably verified to a lesser standard**.
- Easily verifiable architecture-independent code.



Formal verification

```
-- Set the user id associated with a process.
```

```
procedure Set_UID (Proc : PID; UID : Unsigned_32)
```

```
with Global => (In_Out => (Proc_Lock, Proc_Registry),  
  Pre      => Is_Valid (Proc) and UID >= 1000,  
  Post     => Get_UID (Proc) = UID;
```

```
procedure Set_UID (Proc : PID; UID : Unsigned_32) is
```

```
begin
```

```
  Registry (Proc).User := UID;
```

```
end Set_UID;
```

How do these benefits extend to userland?

```
// Set the real and effective user Ids  
// to 1000.  
int err = setuids(1000, 1000);
```

```
mov $59, %rax  
mov $1000, %rdi  
mov $1000, %rsi  
syscall # <- Straight to Ironclad!
```

- We never have to leave formally verified code!

Limitations of POSIX and userland verification

```
ssize_t read(int fd, void *buffer, size_t count);
```

Global state is not properly encapsulated!

Limitations of POSIX and userland verification

```
ssize_t read(int fd, void *buffer, size_t count);  
    // FD is a socket.  
    // FD is non blocking, so no waiting.  
    // And this goes all the way up the chain...
```

Global state is not properly encapsulated!

What's next for Ironclad

- Finishing the last bells and whistles to get Xorg and a proper desktop environment to run.
- Do a port to riscv-based boards, like the visionfive series.
- Expand the existing networking to more network cards.

Follow the progress, check the source code, or download distributions at <https://ironclad.cx>

Thanks to



AdaCore

Thanks to

- Mintsuki <<https://github.com/mintsuki>>
- Lucretia <<https://github.com/lucretia>>
- Ineiev <<https://savannah.gnu.org/users/ineiev>>

